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to discern any real patterns from his historical survey, and even if any exist, the
stockbroker’s warning that “future results
cannot be predicted from past performance”
applies. At best, “if anything approaching
a principle emerges from the confused
record of the past it may be that the natural political environment for navies,
their raison d’être, is the unforeseen. . . .
Warships allow choice, naval force is a
flexible instrument.”
The book is a good short summary of the
political uses of naval force, both intended and unintended, over the past
fifty years. However, it is of limited value
in helping today’s defense analysts and
policy makers think through the requirements for tomorrow’s naval forces.
JAN VAN TOL

Commander, U.S. Navy
CNO Executive Panel Staff

Lambert, Nicholas. Sir John Fisher’s Naval Revolution. Columbia: Univ. of South Carolina Press,
1999. 364pp. $39.95

This is a very good book and a very important one. Nicholas Lambert has followed in the path of Jon Sumida’s In
Defense of Naval Supremacy to present a
lucid, compelling, and comprehensive
analysis of the policies of Admiral Sir
John Fisher and the Royal Navy in the
decade before 1914. This work is based
upon Lambert’s doctoral study of the development of the submarine, but it goes
much farther than his original work in
explaining the fundamental elements of
Fisher’s naval policies and their effects on
the Royal Navy.
Lambert’s command of the primary
sources is remarkable. He supplements
grand strategy, national financial policy,
and politics with the details of
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operational and tactical concepts with a
skill that illuminates the linkages between
the various levels and gives them all sufficient and appropriate weight. His treatment not only lays bare the superficial
nature of much previous historical research in this era but also indicates the
degree to which that superficiality has
caused our understanding of the period
to be profoundly flawed.
The book is not an easy read, but Lambert’s solid prose and grasp of his narrative allow the reader to follow his way
through the labyrinth that was British
naval policy in the Fisher era. To detail
all its facets would take up an entire issue
of the Naval War College Review, but
some explanation is worthwhile.
Lambert makes clear that Fisher was installed as First Sea Lord in 1904 primarily
to cut spending at a time when the British government desperately needed to
achieve economies in its budget. He shows
that Fisher developed extraordinary
schemes to utilize emergent technology
to maintain Britain’s naval dominance
when that dominance was being increasingly challenged and the country’s ability
to pay becoming ever more dubious. He
shows too that Fisher’s ideas of dominance
always focused on Britain’s worldwide requirements, particularly in the protection
of sea communications (the threat from
Germany was not the primary motivation
of British naval policy until much later).
Lambert shows the devious way in which
Fisher operated, often concealing his true
motivations from politicians and naval
colleagues alike, but he also maps out the
logic behind the admiral’s approach. To
Sumida’s explanation of the origins of
the battle cruiser as the worldwide instrument of commerce protection, Lambert adds the concept of the “flotilla,” by
which small craft—both surface and
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submersible—with torpedoes would
close the “narrow seas” around the British Isles and the Mediterranean to the
operation of enemy battle fleets and protect Britain and its possessions from attack. “Flotilla defence” would effectively
replace the capital ship as the primary element in Britain’s naval strength.
Lambert shows how Fisher always returned
to these ideas as the best ways for Britain
to utilize both its technological advantages
and its strategic geography to achieve affordable naval supremacy. Even in retirement Fisher continued his efforts, and
Lambert has discovered incontrovertible
proof that in 1914, when the overseas
building rates of battleships had become
more than British finances could match,
Fisher persuaded Winston Churchill, the
young First Lord, to cancel the construction of at least two battleships and divert
the funding to submarines and destroyers. In other words, the British in 1914
were on the point of stopping battleship
construction altogether.
Lambert’s mastery of detail is apparent
throughout this volume, but there are
four aspects that are most important for
the readership of the Naval War College
Review and for the challenges ahead.
The first is Lambert’s exposition of the
issues that the Royal Navy faced as an organisation, some of which will have a
particular resonance for the contemporary audience. Finance was always a fundamental concern, but there were other
factors as well. Cutting construction to
save money jeopardised the existence of
the industrial capacity on which Britain’s
latent supremacy at sea rested. Much of
Britain’s power derived from the fact that
it could, in the final event, construct and
arm more warships more quickly than
any rival; it was essential that this ability
be maintained. The “We Want Eight”
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crisis of 1909 may thus have had Fisher’s
desire to sustain that capability as its primary cause, rather than his fears of German expansion.
The British also faced a crisis of manpower. Not only was the Royal Navy
hard pressed to recruit sufficient personnel to man the increasing numbers
of battleships and armoured cruisers
entering service in the first years of the
century, but retention was poor, particularly amongst the more highly skilled
ratings vital to their operation. Even if
the government provided the funds,
the Navy did not have the human capacity to expand indefinitely to match
increases in foreign naval capability. The
primary focus of the redeployment process, which saw the removal of ships
from overseas stations and the apparent concentration of forces in British
waters, was not the German threat but
the need to employ manpower more efficiently; perhaps, also, by retaining
ships in home waters rather than keeping them semipermanently overseas it
would improve the quality of life of the
ships’ companies. The peacetime deployment of the fleet therefore did not
necessarily reflect the intentions for its
operations in a conflict.
A corollary to this is the fact that the primary focus of the Admiralty’s effort was
the defence of the empire as a whole; the
force that it sought to create was always
intended to have worldwide responsibilities. The fleet that fought the 1914–18
war in the North Sea, the “Grand Fleet of
Battle,” was an attempt to use resources
that had been created the previous decade
to the greatest effect within a theatre that
was much more confined than had been
expected only a few years earlier. The enemies that Britain faced in 1914 did not
include Italy or any other power with the
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potential to interfere with British maritime communications to the degree Russia or France could have. As it was, the
problems of organising the Grand Fleet
to be an effective tactical entity were such
that many in the Royal Navy did not regard it as a practical offensive force. The
results of Jutland show they had a point.
Thus we see the importance of Lambert’s
careful inclusion of what was going on in
the fleets at sea in terms of operational innovation and development. Sir John Fisher’s
Naval Revolution makes it absolutely
clear that whatever their failings in critical thinking, staff work, and analytical
method, the senior officers of the Royal
Navy were not operating in an intellectual
vacuum, and that those in seagoing command were energetically attempting to
exploit the emergent technology to the
full. Because these officers were responsible
for the fighting efficiency of the Royal
Navy, however, they were required to work
with what they had. As with the aircraft
carrier in the 1920s and 1930s, this reality
explains the contemporary logic of many
decisions that seem misguided in retrospect. It also explains a good part (though
not all) of the opposition to Fisher’s ideas,
even amongst his erstwhile supporters,
and thus a good part (though not all) of
Fisher’s deviousness. At the same time,
Lambert does not neglect the effects of
personality and party in his description of
the controversies that raged over Fisher
and naval policy. There are human beings
in this book.
Lambert’s mastery of context is, above
all, why this work should be read by all
who are involved with naval policy. He
analyses the elements of British decision
making and its consequences in terms of
contemporary conditions, not hindsight.
Lambert clearly explains the ways in
which solutions and makeshifts were
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developed to answer, in the time available, the problems that the Royal Navy
faced. He places clear and necessary emphasis on the British need to maintain
warfighting capabilities year by year, in
spite of all the stresses on the budget and
the “stop-go” nature of so many of the
new capabilities, such as the submarine
and long-range gunnery fire control. In
the uncertain strategic environment of
the opening years of the twentieth century, the Royal Navy could not afford to
surrender existing or immediately available battle power in favor of unproven
systems. Nor could it permit the deterioration of the industrial capacity that allowed it to outbuild rivals in an
emergency, or continue to seek “more of
the same” at the expense of national finances. However ambitious Fisher’s
ideas, all of what he did was influenced by
these imperatives, as he sought to position
the navy to exploit new possibilities.
Lambert’s story of the Royal Navy before
1914 presents a picture completely different from the accepted one, but it is a picture that is solidly founded in primary
sources. Equally to the point, it is one
that is wholly convincing in total and
represents a more satisfying explanation
of what happened, and why, than we
have ever had before. It is a study that
should sound a familiar note for those
who have themselves had to struggle with
the same sort of problems in other navies
and defence forces in recent years.
As one who has written on the operational history of the Royal Navy in the
opening months of the First World War,
I now believe that such history, and indeed the entire history of the war at sea,
needs to be approached anew. I also believe that Lambert’s work proves that we
should look again at more of the history
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of twentieth-century navies with the
same comprehensiveness.
JAMES GOLDRICK

Captain, Royal Australian Navy

Maffeo, Steven E. Most Secret and Confidential: Intelligence in the Age of Nelson. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2000. 355pp. $32.95

In Most Secret and Confidential, Steven
Maffeo has written an exceptional study
of how intelligence was collected and
used during the French Revolutionary
Wars and the Napoleonic Wars of the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
To limited degrees, the intelligence activities of the United States, Spain, Russia,
Denmark, and several other European
nations are described. More detail is provided concerning the excellent French intelligence efforts under Napoleon. The bulk
of the text, however, deals with the use of
intelligence by the British government,
especially the Admiralty, during the years
between 1793 and 1815.
Maffeo, who is a commander in a naval
reserve intelligence unit, has combined
his intelligence expertise with the skills
of an accomplished historian to write
this informative and most enjoyable
history of British intelligence efforts
during this period. His knowledge of
the history of intelligence operations is
excellent, and his grasp of the British
navy of this era is unsurpassed. He uses
not only primary sources (government
papers and personal letters) to document his work but also the books of such
novelists as C. S. Forester and Patrick
O’Brian to make his points.
The opening chapter describes how the
British government collected intelligence. It has been clear that Lloyd’s of
London, by means of its agents located
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around the world, was able to provide a
continuous flow of intelligence to the government, but it is fascinating to learn
that by virtue of opening diplomatic and
personal mail, the British Post Office
became the largest intelligence-gathering branch of the government.
Subsequent chapters treat other aspects of
the British intelligence effort. The Admiralty’s collection and use of intelligence is
discussed in depth, and so is the transmission of information. The difficulties are
shown of sending any type of message, especially when the usual form of communication at sea was signal flags, which were
useless at night or in limited visibility,
such as in battle. The subject of several
chapters is the commander as his own intelligence officer. Some commanders, such
as Nelson, were expert intelligence officers; others were not. However, all commanders had to sort through whatever
information was available to them and
make the best decisions they could—they
were literally on their own. Communications between detached fleets and the Admiralty often took weeks, if not months.
Commanders, therefore, without knowledge of the current government policy,
would ultimately decide on courses of action. The fact that they were fully supported by the Admiralty and the
government demonstrates the high level
of intelligence skills among the officers of
the Royal Navy.
The concluding chapters are case studies
that show what role intelligence, or the
lack thereof, played in three naval engagements. They are remarkable summations of the Indian Ocean action of Pulo
Aur in February 1804, the Copenhagen
expedition of December 1800–April
1801, and the Nile campaign of March
through August 1798. These three chapters form an excellent conclusion.
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